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I 
n Being and Time, Heidegger’s existential analysis of death 
describes the structure and the ways in which Dasein can 
comport itself to its own death.  In his essay Heidegger on 
Death, Paul Edwards objects to this existential-structure of-
fering eight critiques.  I however, will only take on the first two 
sections. Though his arguments are complex, Edwards’ objec-
tions are often based on two basic conclusions. Either what 
Heidegger says is false or his arguments are platitudes and fail to 
say anything new or insightful.  Edwards clearly says if he finds 
an argument or assertion to be a mere platitude it would make 
the argument pointless and invalid in a loosely logical way. In 
the first section, Edwards attacks the idea that all people die 
alone.  In the second, Edwards objects to Heidegger’s belief that 
death is untransferable.  I believe Edwards has misinterpreted 
Heidegger because his criticism fails to address the significance 
of Dasein’s being-in-a-world and being-with-others.  Furthermore, 
he places his focus on the wrong part of Heidegger’s analysis.  
 In section 1 Edwards takes issue with the idea that Heidegger 
and Heideggerians claim that all people die alone. Though 
Heidegger never says this explicitly, Edwards argues that 
Heidegger’s ‘non-relational’ aspect of death implies this as a fact.   
Heidegger defines death as: “Dasein’s ownmost possibility—non-
relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped.”i Ed-
wards cannot accept the idea that all people die alone, “simply as 
a consequence of their mortality,” but that means he must clearly 
define ‘dying alone’. He outlines three possible ways someone 
could die alone and, based on these definitions, concludes 
Heidegger is wrong.  A person can be said to ‘die alone’:  1) “If 
no other human being is with him when he dies,” 2) “if there are 
no other human beings near him with whom he has any strong 
emotional bonds,” 3) If he is the only one dying as opposed to 
“dying together.”ii  Based on these definitions, it cannot be said 
that all people die alone. In the first scenario, many people in the 
world die surrounded by people who are taking care of them.  In 
the second, many people die with their loved ones at their side.  
In the third definition, sometimes people die, tragically, in a 
group. Therefore the idea that all people ‘die alone’ is clearly 
false 
 What has happened, says Edwards, is Heidegger has rede-
fined dying alone “so as to be logically equivalent to ‘dying.’”iii 
The way in which “dying alone,” is written in Heideggerian phi-
losophy is grammatically equivalent to “dying in poverty,” or 
“dying in bed.” “In both these cases,” says Edwards, “we clearly 
have a synthetic relation: ‘dying in poverty’ means more than 
‘dying’ and the same is true of ‘dying in bed’” and “dying 
alone.”vi The problem with Heidegger’s assertions is that if dying 
alone means just “dying,” then it boils down to saying that all 
people die someday, making his arguments platitudinous, i.e. 
failing to be insightful or be a discovery of anything new. If, on 
the other hand, ‘dying alone’ means more than just dying, in the 
same way that dying in poverty and dying in bed mean more 
than ‘dying’, then it is clearly false based on the three ways Ed-
wards defines ‘dying alone’. ‘Dying alone,’ does mean more than 
‘dying’, therefore Heidegger’s idea that all people die alone is 
false.  
 Edwards’ critique misinterprets Heidegger’s notion of death 
as a non-relational possibility. The non-relational aspect of death 
doesn’t refer to Edwards’ definitions of ‘dying alone’, but to two 
significant aspects of Dasein’s being.  Being-in-a-world and being-
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with-others are so significant to Dasein’s existence that they must 
be included in a discussion on death. Thus Heidegger carries 
these ideas from the first division throughout Being and Time.  
Being-in-a-world must be carried into the discussion of death in 
order to juxtapose death as an existential possibility of not being-
in-a-world.  
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself 
has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein 
stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for
-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is 
nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its 
death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-
be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this pos-
sibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself 
in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein 
have been undone. This ownmost non-relational 
possibility is at the same time the utter most one.v  
Edwards, however, fails to include a discussion of how Dasein’s 
being-in-a-world relates to its death, i.e. it’s no-longer-being-in-a-
world. Dasein’s being is grounded in being with other people, 
e.g. friends, family, co-workers.  In being-with-others-in-a-world 
Dasein is forced to have a relation towards others: a spatial rela-
tion, an emotional relation etc. “Being with Others belongs to the 
Being of Daseins, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. 
Thus as Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Oth-
ers.”vi This is unavoidable since Dasein is thrown into a world.  
Throwness requires Dasein to take attitude towards the world 
and other Daseins. 
 For example, if two friends have a fight and decide never 
speak to one other again they have not ended their relationship.  
All they have done is changed the way in which they relate to 
one another.  Their relationship has gone from love to hate, or 
from a desire to be with one another to the desire to not be 
around each other at all.  Their spatial separation and emotional 
disdain for one another does not constitute a severing of rela-
tions, merely an alteration.  So long as one of them is living they 
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will relate to one another, even if they never think about each 
other ever again.  This is hard to see but consider that their lives 
would have been fundamentally different if they had remained 
friends, or if they had ended their friendship at a different time 
in their lives.  Because Dasein is thrown into a world and is fun-
damentally for-the-sake-of-others we cannot avoid relating to the 
other in some way. Our relationships with others affect who we 
are, what we choose to care about and how we choose to act. So 
long as we are alive we exist alongside-others with some kind of 
attitude towards them and this comes with being in a world.   
 In death, Dasein can no longer comport itself towards other 
Daseins in any way, because Dasein goes from being-in-a-world to 
not-being-in-a-world. Since being in a world requires Dasein to 
take up an attitude towards the world, not-being-in-a-world 
would quite naturally entail the opposite. Hence death is a non-
relational being.  Non-relational means an inability to comport 
oneself to the world and to others in any way. In other words, 
Death is the real end of Dasein’s relation to others and the world. 
In death Dasein cannot hate, love, talk to, not-talk to, shun, or 
embrace other Daseins.  Other Heideggerians do choose to inter-
pret this as ‘dying alone’ but it is not the type of loneliness that 
Edwards has in mind, it is much more dense than that.  Ed-
wards’ first definition of ‘dying alone,’ comes the closest to what 
Heidegger really means, however, even if there is no one around 
at the end of a person’s life, that person can still relate to the 
world and all the people he has ever known.  What ‘dying alone,’ 
really means is dying into loneliness, going from being-in-a-
world to no-being-in-a-world.  Since this happens to everyone, 
all Daseins be said to die alone. Because Edwards has left out the 
worldliness of Dasein and its essential being-with-others he 
misses the unique sense in which Dasein non-relational being 
can be construed as dying alone. 
 Edwards would probably maintain his objection saying that 
this non-relational ‘state’ is only present after Dasein dies. When 
Dasein is ‘dying’ however, he or she can still be with other peo-
ple.  Heidegger would be forced to concede this point.  However, 
Edwards would still be failing to fully appreciate the idea of no-
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longer-being-in-a-world and how fundamental that is to Dasein, 
something that he continually fails to take into account when at-
tacking Heidegger 
 Section 2 of Edward’s critique takes on the 
“untransferability” of death and once again fails to give credit to 
Dasein’s worldliness.  Furthermore, his critiques are based on 
examples that misunderstand the meaning of death as untrans-
ferable. The idea that Dasein’s death is untransferable or in other 
words, one Dasein cannot stand in for another Dasein’s death in 
order to gain an ontological understanding of death, comes from 
section 47 of Being and Time.  Edwards’ critique of this idea 
doesn’t fully grasp what Heidegger attempting to do.  The main 
goal of section 47 is to establish that we cannot come to an onto-
logical understanding of death in observing the death of others.  
But above all, the suggestion that the dying of Others is a 
substitute theme for the ontological analysis of Dasein’s 
totality and the settling of its account, rests on a presup-
position which demonstrably fails altogether to recognize 
Dasein’s kind of being. This is what one presupposes 
when one is of the opinion that any Dasein may be substi-
tuted for another at random, so that what cannot be expe-
rienced in one’s own Dasein is accessible in that of a 
stranger.vii  
 Edwards is guilty of making this presupposition because he 
fails to acknowledge the significance of Dasein’s ‘worldliness’.  
Though Edwards agrees with the idea that we cannot get an on-
tological sense of death through the death of Others, Edwards 
argues that the untransferability of death only asserts that no one 
can keep another person from dying—in other words, a mere 
platitude. Furthermore, his failure to recognize the importance of 
death being the end of Dasein’s being-in-a-world and being-with
-others leads him to the assertion that one can substitute another 
in death like a teacher’s assistant standing in for the professor.  
 Edwards uses the example of lecturing to argue that death is 
transferable. He imagines that a situation arises where he is una-
ble to deliver a lecture, in responses he sends his assistant to de-
liver the lecture he had planned on giving.  He says his assis-
Heidegger’s World and Dasein’s Death 41 
tant’s ability to stand in for him is exactly like one Dasein being 
able to represent another Dasein in death.   
Now, I wish to insist that Blau’s substitution for 
me in the matter of dying is, in all relevant re-
spects, exactly, parallel to his substituting for me at 
New School for Humanistic Studies. He substitut-
ed at the New School by lecturing and discussing 
the topic that I would have discussed if I had gone 
in. He produced certain effects upon the students 
analogous to those I would have produced.viii  
If he sends his assistant to substitute him at an execution, he will 
experience the same feelings, that Edwards would feel and he 
will suffer the way that Edwards would have suffered. Perhaps 
Edwards is correct about the scenario in which his assistant must 
lecture, but he is wrong in saying that this scenario is analogous 
to his death.  In Edwards’ example, his assistant remains in the 
world after he has finished the lecture. He can come back to the 
office and share his experience with Edwards: who asked ques-
tions, how comfortable or uncomfortable he felt delivering the 
lecture etc.—his relation to other Daseins persists.  However, Ed-
wards does not take the time to flesh out a scenario that would 
explain how substitute teaching is analogous to death and that 
takes Dasein’s being-in-a-world into account.  If he did, he would 
have found that the two scenarios look completely different.  
 After Blau is killed he cannot come back to the office and tell 
Edwards what he felt. This may sound trite or obvious but only 
if someone doesn’t fully appreciate Dasein’s being as being-in-a-
world.  The result of Edward’s example would look ridiculous if 
one could actually transfer one’s death to another Dasein and 
remain consistent with the idea that death takes Dasein out of 
being-in-a-world. If Edwards were to die, naturally his family 
would mourn him.  In this case, according to Edwards, he has 
transferred his death to his assistant and therefore his assistant 
would die Edwards’ death.  Therefore, after Blau dies Edwards’ 
family should begin to mourn as if Edwards had actually died.  
Edwards would probably burst in on the funeral and wonder 
why everyone was ignoring him and weeping Blau’s body while 
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calling him ‘Paul’.  This is obviously a ridiculous scenario be-
cause Edwards is still in the world and can still comport himself 
to the world and others.  He can still talk to his family, he can 
love them or hate them, stand alongside them, and continue to 
change or maintain a relationship with them.  This would be im-
possible in death.  
 Again Edwards could retort with, “all that you’ve shown is 
that I am not dead,” which is true but once again a failure to see 
the point. What I’ve shown is how being-in-a-world is essential 
to Dasein and that death takes away this essential being.  In do-
ing so I’ve demonstrated the significance of being-in-a-world as 
related to death. Edwards’ objection fails because it doesn’t take 
into account the way in which Dasein is being-in-the-world and 
being-with-others, and how in death this being ends for the de-
ceased. Heidegger’s arguments are not trite because he is assert-
ing more than everybody dies, he is showing how death individ-
ualizes us based on our relationships in the world and the way 
we are being-in-a-world.  
 Edwards’ conclusions have clearly failed to recognize a very 
important aspect of Dasein.  But why is it that he has left out a 
discussion of Being-in-a-world and its relation to death?  I won-
der if his failure to talk about being-in-a-world comes from a 
conscious decision not to discuss how one can be authentic in 
relation to one’s own death. 
I have also not undertaken an analysis of the slip-
pery concept of “authenticity’ and I have not at-
tempted an evaluation of the contention by vari-
ous Hedeiggerians that enormous benefits would 
accrue to the human race if people started think-
ing about death “authentically.”ix  
This choice, in my opinion, is a mistake because it fails to address 
the reason Heidegger delves into an analysis of death.  Edwards 
often objects to Heidegger’s arguments only because, as he says, 
they fail to make a significant to discovery or bring something 
new to an understanding of death.  However, if one were criticiz-
ing Einstein because general relativity failed to bring something 
new to an understanding of the speed of light, they would look 
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ridiculous because they are choosing to criticize the wrong part 
of the discussion. Edwards critique fails to look at the part of 
Heidegger’s analysis that is more interesting and far more un-
clear, inauthentic and authentic being-towards-death. 
 In talking about inauthentic and authentic being-towards-
death one must also take into account Dasein’s being-in-a-world 
because both these modes of being-towards-death require one to 
think about Dasein acting in its world with others.  Leaving out 
this part of Heidegger’s analysis would result in a failure to see 
how significant being-in-a-world is for Dasein. The closest Ed-
wards comes to a discussion of authenticity and death is in sec-
tion 3 where he critiques our being-towards-death. His argument 
is that Heidegger is once again making a platitudinous state-
ment, i.e. everyone dies and humans know they are going to die. 
Furthermore he interprets Heidegger as saying “all human be-
ings are dying all the time.”  Heidegger does say that Dasein is 
always dying, “Factically, Dasein is dying as long as it exists, but 
proximally and for the most part, it does so by way of falling.”x 
But this is only to say that Dasein moves closer towards its death 
with every passing moment.  Furthermore, because Dasein is al-
ways ahead-of-itself in terms of directing itself towards future 
projects and goals, meaning that it also runs towards its own 
death, since its death is in the future. However, this does not 
touch upon what Heidegger truly means by being-towards 
death. 
  In the same way Dasein must take up an attitude towards 
the world and others, it must take up an attitude towards its 
death. “In Being-towards-death, Dasein comports itself towards 
itself as a distinctive potentiality-for-being.”xi  This amounts to 
much more than saying Dasein is aware of its own mortality.  
Being-towards-death means that Dasein’s actions disclose its atti-
tude towards its own death.  This can either be authentic or inau-
thentic.  In an inauthentic being-towards-death one flees death, 
and turns it into something in the world that is to be feared. Au-
thentic being-towards-death, on the other hand is an anxious an-
ticipation of death. Being-towards-death goes beyond just know-
ing you are going to die; it is a way of acting out your knowing.  
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For example, someone could react to their own death in the fol-
lowing inauthentic ways.  If they shut themselves up in their 
home unwilling to go out and engage with others in the world, 
they have taken up the fearful attitude towards death, wanting to 
remain safe and runaway from dangerous situations.  On the 
other hand, if someone constantly goes out to bars and engages 
in self-destructive behavior, they have also revealed that they 
have turned death into a fearful entity because they want to ex-
perience all the frivolity of the world and not think about their 
death, i.e. ignore it by remaining externally active and never be-
ing intellectually critical. 
 Heidegger strays away from any moral arguments, making 
his assertions about authentic being-towards-death unclear.  Ed-
wards could have attacked Heidegger’s notion of authentically 
being-towards-death on the grounds that Heidegger is unclear as 
to what “anticipating,” one’s own death means. In section 53 
Heidegger says: 
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-
self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of be-
ing itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solici-
tude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned free-
dom towards death—a freedom which has been re-
leased from illusions of the “they”, and which is facti-
cal, certain of itself, and anxious. xii 
However, Heidegger doesn’t specify what exactly this would 
look like.  One could argue that this is a serious problem since 
‘anticipation’ has a similar connotation as expecting one’s death, 
which would be an inauthentic way of being-towards-death. 
Heidegger says, “Expecting is not just occasional looking-away 
from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a 
waiting for that actualization”xiii In expecting, one is always won-
dering when they will die and how, and in this way of being one 
conceptualizes death as an actuality not as a possibility, ultimate-
ly mischaracterizing their own death.  Anticipation itself, sounds 
like a synonym of ‘expecting’ and because Heidegger only gives 
an abstract definition of anticipation, it’s hard to fully under-
stand what exactly Heidegger means. Since Heidegger’s analysis 
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is all for the sake of describing how we act towards our own 
death, and he cannot give one concrete example of what authen-
tic being-towards-death would look like, his argument is suspi-
cious at best.   
 It’s possible however, to say that anticipating one’s own 
death manifests differently for every Dasein. Authentic being-
towards-death sounds like a call for people to take responsibility 
for who they want to be and what they want to do and in each 
case that being will be unique.  In an ‘anticipating’ all our actions 
are done in relation to the fact that we are finite mortals.  There-
fore we must keep death in front of us in making a decision as to 
who we want to be and what we want to do with the limited 
time we have.  This requires a moral statement if one were to un-
derstand how one could be ‘excited’ about the possibility of 
death. Authentic being-towards-death requires one to act in such 
away that takes Dasein’s mortality into account.  Knowing that 
you will die calls one to do something that is meaningful for one-
self, regardless of whether that behavior belongs to a pre-
developed set of values endorse by a group in society. What 
meaningful act Dasein chooses to make its possibility will differ 
from one Dasein to another.  
Paul Edwards’ objections in section 1 and 2 fail because 
he does not address Dasein’s being-in-a-world.  In section 1 he 
takes death’s non-relational aspect to mean all Dasein’s die 
alone.  However his definitions do not capture the aloneness that 
is meant in ‘non-relational’.  Dasein exists in a world and thereby 
always has a relation to the world and to others in it.  In dying 
those relations are severed because Dasein loses its being-in-a-
world.  Because Dasein loses its relation to the world one can say 
all Dasein die alone.  In section 2 Edwards says that the 
‘untransferability’ of death simply means that everyone dies, 
making the assertion a mere platitude. Once again Edwards fails 
to recognize Dasein’s being-in-a-world.  Because every Dasein 
has its own world it can only lose its specific relationships to 
Other Daseins and its world.  To take away someone’s death is to 
take away his or her being-in-a-world which is impossible even if 
someone is executed in place of another. The Dasein who lives 
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still maintains his relationships with Other Daseins because he 
maintains his being-in-a-world.   
 Ultimately Edwards’ critique fails because he chooses to fo-
cus his attention on the Existential structure of death rather than 
on the more significant aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of authen-
tic being-towards-death.  Edwards does critique being-towards 
death but again misinterprets what being-towards-death really 
means. Just like how Dasein has a world that to which it must 
relate, it must relate to its own death in some way, and this can 
be done either authentically or inauthentically.  Because 
Heidegger doesn’t make a moral statement concerning authentic 
versus inauthentic being-towards-death his analysis feels incom-
plete which would have allowed Edwards to give stronger objec-
tions. Death inevitably calls for a moral statement because it begs 
the question what should I do with the time I am given.  If one 
wants to be authentic then the answer can only come from 
Dasein itself. 
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